

1942

British Embassy, Bagdad.

FO 624/28

No.: 152

PART FOUR

FROM 131 - 165

Name of File:—

IRAN : KURDS

(No minutes to be written here.)

LAST Year's File No.: ✓

(16)

NEXT Year's File No.: _____

MINUTE SHEET.

Reference 152/165/42

H.E.

Counsellor.

I submit a draft to Tehran replying to 152/165/42,
also a draft to Colonel Lyon.

I feel that it is better
to say nothing to Tehran
about the warnings
to Mahmmud Khan.

V.H.

22nd July, 1942.

1 am
w

H. E.

In paragraph (2) we are told that the Minister of War has advised the Persian Government to give the Jaf formal permission to remain.

How can we judge what decision the Persian Government have taken?

I suspect that the advice of the Minister of Defence will in fact prevail and in that event there is nothing more to be done.

Mr. Edmonds told me last Tuesday that the Jaf chiefs had gone to Senna to give presents to the Persian General Amini so perhaps all will be well.

I suggest no action until the matter can be discussed further with Mr. Edmonds on 21/7.

17.7.42.

Sulaimani reports that Jaf
representatives went to see
General Amiri with presents, value
not stated. The latter said that
they would have to pay a grazing fee
to the Persian agent for the area -
Mahmud Khan of Kamsar (Mersin).
I think that tribal mentality is
sufficiently elastic to allow us to
stand back & let events take their course.
If the Jaf become very badly things may
flare up but as there is no Persian
authority in area there may well be
none. I will try to have warning

Enclosed is Mahmud Khan's letter to the Governor
of Bengal with the copy of the letter in case
of further order. I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Yours obedient servant,
22/7

Iran: Kurds

152/165/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received.

PARAP

From: Sir R. Bullard,
Tehran.

To: H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

Copies to:

X G.O.C.

X C.I.C.I.

PARAP COPIES TO LYON & EDWARDS

Despatched: 16/7/42, 19.20 hrs.

Received: " 24.00 "

Decyphered: 17/7/42, 08.35 "

No. 258 (See 152/166/42) of 16th July, 1942

IMPORTANT

Addressed to BAGDAD No. 258

Repeated to Kermanshah,
Foreign Office.

Your telegram No. 176.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs state that they have pointed out to the Iraqi Government that Iranian regulations regarding the duties of tribes coming to Iran for grazing have not been complied with. The Jaf tribe must therefore leave the country or the Iranian Government will use force including bombing to compel departure. Summary of the negotiations just received goes to you by bag.

2. Meanwhile M.A. has spoken to the Min. of War who says there is no, repeat no, present intention to take any aggressive action against the Jaf. He had advised the Iranian Govt. to regularise the position by giving them formal permission to remain. See also Kermanshah tel. 98 to me. Serious situation might arise and if the Jaf misbehave we cannot guarantee to restrain the local Iranian hotheads. It is most regrettable that at a time when we are trying to compose local differences Iraqi authorities should allow the Jaf tribe to take advantage of local situation to enter Iran armed and without permission.

JAM/EM
JM
RK

(Paraphrase to Tel. LYON!)

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Iran: Kurds.

152/164/42



Tel No. - G/1952.
Date - 13 July.
From - TENTH ARMY
To - BRITISH LEGATION, TEHERAN.

SECRET.

T.O.O. 0730 GMT

152/151/42 YOUR TELEGRAM 213 OF 12 JUNE (.)

ONE (.) MY VIEWS ON USE OF BRITISH TROOPS IN AID OF PERSIAN GOVT ARE EXPRESSED FULLY IN MY LETTER G/1701 DATED 22 JUNE TO YOU (.)

TWO (.) THE PRESERVATION OF ORDER IS THE TASK OF THAT GOVERNMENT AND EVERY STEP SHOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPRESS THIS PRINCIPLE ON IT AND ITS OFFICIALS (.)

THREE (.) MY ORDERS ARE THAT BRITISH TROOPS WILL NOT BE USED IN AID OF PERSIAN AUTHORITIES WITHOUT PRIOR SANCTION OF GHQ MEF (.)

FOUR (.) BRITISH TROOPS MAY BE USED IN AN EMERGENCY ON DEMAND OF YOUR LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO HOWEVER HAS TO JUSTIFY HIS ACTION (.)

S/d B. J. Underhill.
Capt. G.S.
13 Jul.

(copy)

cf. 152/162/42.

Handwritten notes and signatures:
17.7.42
7/17.
17/17
17/17

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Iran: Kurds

152/163/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received.
PARAP

From : H.M. Consul,
Kermanshah.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

Copies to : x G.O.C.
x G.I.C.I.

Despatched : 9/7/42, 20.00 hrs.

Received : 10/7/42, 09.00 "

Decyphered : " 10.00 "

No. 44

of 9th July, 1942

Addressed to TEHRAN No. 98

Repeated to Bagdad,
Foreign Office.

Bagdad telegram 176.

I saw General SHA..... today and mentioned the JAFS using all the arguments to hand and adding that possibly the less attention drawn to this area by such drastic action as bombing the better.

2. The ^Ggeneral does not like to admit that Iranian administration there is lacking or even faulty. He even says his forces would protect the Jafa if they had left arms behind. He declares the Iraqi authorities are taking no steps to reach agreement with the Iranian Government in the matter and obviously resents the alleged attitude of fait accompli. Of course, I am not aware of the Iraqi Government's action or lack of action and am enquiring of their Consul here.

3. I am glad to say General SHA..... agreed to take no drastic steps for the present, so that further discussions may take place - he hoped successful ones.

4. My personal and ⁺secret opinion is that the fact that the Jafa have no heavy grazing dues (repeatedly mentioned in our discussion) has something to do with the present dispute. Iranian officers on the spot and the General himself most probably feel cheated of the proportion they would legally or illegally have gained from these dues. Would it not be possible for the Iraqi Government to offer some token payment on behalf of their nationals (who will return in the autumn and can presumably be taxed if necessary at the Iraqi frontier) as a tentative move towards peaceful solution.

+ sic

GDM/EM
JM
MR

Copies (handwritten) to 'Edwards'

608 2 ym.

17070/7

*sent-
11/7
"J.B."*

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152

Iran: Kurds

152/161/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received.

From : FOREIGN OFFICE
LONDONTo : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

CODE

Copies to : X G.O.C.
X C.I.C.I.

Despatched : 7.7. 0530

Received : 8.7. 0730

Decyphered : 8.7. 0855

No. (663) 3. 662

of 6th July, 1942.

Addressed to TEHRAN No. 988Rptd. Minister of State, Cairo.
Bagdad.

Your despatch No. 181. Kurdish situation, Iran.
I approve general line which you propose to take
as set out in paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 of your
despatch. I desire to be kept fully informed
and +assume +you will wish to retain considerable
+caution in working out your proposals.

+by change
+" "
+" "

RD
JB
RK

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152

Iran: Kurds. 152/160/42

TELEGRAM.

How Sent

PARAP

Copies

Sent To:

From : H. M. AMBASSADOR.
BAGDAD.

To: H.M. MINISTER TEHRAN.

Date 7.7.1942.

Time Despatched 1140 ✓

No. 176

X GOC
X CICI
Col.
Lyon
Parap'

152/153/42

+ Mr Edmonds
11/7
"J.B"

IMPORTANT.

Addressed to TEHRAN NO. 176,
rptd to Foreign Office No. 700,
Kermanshah No. 18.

My telegram No. 160, paragraph 2.

Adviser to Ministry of the Interior informs me that Persian Government have warned Iraqi Government that unless the tribe withdraws to Iraq they will bomb the Jaf on grounds that tribe has failed to comply with conditions of entry (including surrender of arms) laid down by Persian Ministry of Interior.

2. As there is no Persian administration in area to which Jaf migrate and neighbouring Persian tribes are now armed as never before Persian Government's attitude appears to be unreasonable.

3. Persians have so far made no charge of lawlessness against Jaf and any unprovoked air action against the tribe will cause grave resentment here and make future situation even more difficult than it is at present.

4. Can you restrain Persian Government ?

= CORNWALLIS =

H.E.

Mr. Edmonds has seen & agrees.
(Itld) V.H.7/7

(Itld) K.C. 7/7.

Handwritten signature and initials

INDEX

VH/KC
CW/BM
RK
RK

Iran: Kurds.

152/159/42

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR,
IRAQ.

المراق

مجلس الوزراء

Baghdad 6th July, 1942

P.S.No.853.

SECRET & URGENT

To
H. B. M's Embassy,
Baghdad (3 copies).

Memo. of 152/153/42

J A F.



1. Communications have been received by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs through the Legation in Teheran, the Consul in Kermanshah and the Persian Legation in Baghdad that the Persians will bomb the Jaf who have crossed the frontier unless they return forthwith to Iraqi territory. The reason given is that the Jaf have not complied with the conditions of entry prescribed by the Persian authorities for nomads entering Persia, particularly that requiring them to enter unarmed.
2. The Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Teheran has been instructed to point out to the Persian authorities that the Jaf are going to their traditional grazing grounds in a normal manner; that in view of the absence of any Persian authority in the neighbourhood to maintain order and the fact that all the neighbouring tribes are now heavily armed the demand that the Jaf shall go unarmed is unreasonable; and that the action proposed is thus unjustified and likely to lead to grave repercussions.
3. As you are aware the Persian authorities have for several years past prevented the Jaf from entering Persia. This is contrary to the whole spirit of the Settlement of 1914; in every case where any question of rights of ownership or traditional rights of pasturage was raised the Demarcation Commission confirmed them in application of the general principle accepted for all cases; no question of the rights of the Jaf was raised and there is thus no specific mention of them; the Persians have argued that there is no specific mention there is no right, and have been more difficult over the Jaf than over others.
4. The Persians have no administration in the area to which the Jaf are going and their demand that the Jaf shall conform to the rules laid down by the Persian Ministry of the Interior has no connexion with reality. Far more it would seem that Shebbakhti finding that

تحت المظلة

he cannot stop them as in the recent past is planning to bomb them out of spite.

5. I suggest that British intervention to restrain Shahbakhti would not be out of place.

ADVISER,

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

Copy to:-

Lieut. Colonel W.A. Lyon, O.B.E.

C. I. C. I., Baghdad.

152

Most Secret

No. 126.

(E3631/2095/6)

Iran: Ruds 152/158/42.

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to His Majesty's Representative at

Bagdad

and transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

June 12. , 1942

Recd.
30 June

Reference to previous correspondence :

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
----------------	----------

To

H.M. Representative

Tehran

N° 129 of June 11, 1942.

Persia: Disturbances
in the Russia Zone.

Elk
H/VX
24.30/6

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A similar despatch has been addressed to His Majesty's Representative at **Angora N° 115**
~~Consular Officer~~ at **Kuibyshev N° 171**

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères N° 7 11192-1 2189



No. 129

(E 2451/2095/0)

NOT SECRET

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

11th June, 1942.

Sir,

152 }
117 }
42 } I have read with interest your despatch No. 129
(144/108/42), of the 19th May, enclosing a copy of the Persian
Minister for War's report to the Prime Minister on his visit
to Reshah to study the situation resulting from the recent
disturbances in that area.

2. I congratulate you on your success in inducing the
Persian and Soviet authorities to cooperate in working out a
peaceful solution of this potentially dangerous incident.
Had the situation been allowed to drift, the mutual
suspicions of the Russians, Persians and Turks might well have
magnified a local incident into a serious crisis.
Mr. Ureghart's efforts to induce the Persian authorities to
tackle the problems involved were also of great value and I
shall be glad if you will convey to him an expression of my
appreciation.

I am, with great truth,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,
(For the Secretary of State)

(sgd) Harold Lassar

A. Holmes Esq., C.M.G., M.C.,
etc., etc., etc.,
M.P.

Iran: Kurds

152/157/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received.

PARAP.

X
Sent
27/6

From : H.M. CONSUL,
KERMANSHAH.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

Copies to : X G.O.C.
X A.O.C.
X C.I.C.I.

Despatched : 26.6.42 (1200)
Received : 26.6.42 (1800)
Decyphered : 27.6.42 (1100)

No. 41 of 25.6.42

Addressed to TEHRAN NO. 89,
rptd to
Bagdad.

During my first official call on General Shahbakti today he dwelt on the incursion of Jaf tribes. I mentioned that this was considered an ancient right, but he said they should ask permission first, pay the customary dues and leave arms behind. I gathered that what rankles, is the lack of respect to the Iranian authority, and General Shahbakti virtually accuses minor Iraqi officials in the frontier districts of encouraging such an attitude. He added that he had only to give the word to certain Kurdish tribes in this area and the Jafs would be thoroughly looted and beaten, but he did not wish to take such action if it could be helped.

....

CW/GM
RK
RK

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HE 29-6
Curlew 29/6
Not action?
HT 27/6

Not unless we
hear from Tehran
we
25/6
HT 29/6

Iran: Kurds

152/156/42.

SECRET.

No. I3A/PA.
KERMANS SHAH.
18th June 1942.



To:♦

Oriental Secretary,
H.M.Embassy,
BAGDAD.

From:-

Political Adviser,
KERMANS SHAH.

Entirely yours
W. H. V. A

152/120/42 }
152/138/42 }

I shall be very grateful if I can be supplied with a copy of Colonel LYON'S memo C/II/250 of the 23rd May giving the names of the contracting parties to the "Pact of the Decapitated Dog" referred to in Mr EDMONDS' memo No. PS 692 dated the 1st June 1942?

2. It would be of the greatest assistance to me if I would be supplied regularly with copies of Colonel LYON'S reports dealing with events in PERSIAN KURDISTAN. If desired I will send you copies of my reports on the same subject. I fancy, however, that you are shown these by 10th Army.

3. Colonel LYON'S memo referred to above is of very great value to me and I shall be most grateful if a copy can kindly be sent to me.

Archived
Peace and
15

1/120/5
P A Kermanshah
with compliments
ref this

W. H. V. A
Lt Colonel,
Political Adviser.

27/6

27 JUN 1942

Iran: Kurds

152/155/42.


Also at
88/9/42 23rd June 1942.
(152/155/42)

Dear Edmund

154/- { Thank you for your letter P.S.
No. 774 of the 16th June.

I shall be interested to know in due course the result of the visit to Panjwin of the qaimmaqam of Halabja.

As regards Nai Khidir and the demarcation of the frontier, the Iraqi Government should, I think, renew representations to the Persian Government and, if they do so, I will recommend to the Foreign Office that His Majesty's Government should give their support to this démarche through our Legation at Tehran.



VH/KC
MR/RK

(Sd.) Kinahan Cornwallis

24/6 25/7

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C. J. EDMONDS ESQ., C.M.G., C.B.E.

1 agree
AFK
Canal
2 agree
20/6

Hame Rashid Khan.

I suggest we await the results of the Qaimmaqam's visit to Panjwin before reporting further.

NAI Khidhr.

I think the Iraqi Government should make representations to the Persian Government for the withdrawal of Persian troops or amniyeh from this post and that we should ask our Legation to support them.

Frontier Demarcation.

The same action seems necessary, mutatis mutandis, as for Nai Khidhr. It is certainly desirable from the point of view of His Majesty's Government that the demarcation should be finished.

See 88/7/42
for last action
Taken.

AF
19th June, 1942.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Iran: Kurds 152/154/42.

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR,
IRAQ.

SECRET.

المراق
وزارة الداخلية
بغداد

Baghdad the 16th June 1942

P.S.No. 774.

Also at
88/8/42



On my return from the Embassy on 14 June, 1942, I spoke to the Minister about Hama Rashid Khan. He agreed to send the qaimmaqam up to Penjwin immediately after the Regent's visit to Halabja early next week. But as to the action to be taken, his attitude (before any expression of views on my part) was much the same as mine had been, viz: (1) we cannot treat Hama Rashid more harshly than the Persians treat their own Begsadas for the same offence; (2) previous experience of the Persians in similar cases does not encourage us to bring him to Sulaimani - the Persians would never cease from complaining of his place or conditions of residence and of any changes, and from objecting to his return and there would be another permanent sore, far more detrimental to the health of the Iraqi-Persian relations than any ephemeral dis-content at the lack of this spectacular measure (incidentally I do not remember that recent telegrams have asked for this but only his recall to Iraqi territory). The qaimmaqam will be instructed to try to get him to return to Iraq if he is not already back (which I think he has been, and that without any standing armed following, for several weeks pace all the Teheran telegrams). Further the Minister agrees that it is up to us to prevent him from gallivanting back over the boundary whenever he likes and subject to the qaimmaqam's report accepted in principle my proposal for putting a temporary police post in his village.

In this connexion I observe that the Teheran Legation are going exactly what they were loth to do in the opposite direction some months ago, viz. using the Embassy as a lever on the Iraqi Government to forward Persian desiderata: you will remember our proposals regarding grazing, the evacuation

of Persian gendarmerie posts in Iraqi territory, and frontier demarcation. When the Bana affair is satisfactorily settled do you think we could ask the Legation to point out to the Persians that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander (the inability of the Persians to realize this simple truth is the key to nearly all Iraqi-Persian friction), that if they want the Legation to intervene effectively on their behalf they must reciprocate, and invite them: (1) to evacuate Hai Khidhr the position of which is clearly shown on Degree Sheet 2/6 Sq. 2/d, and (2) to resume work this autumn on the demarcation of the boundary with a British technical expert as arbitrator (the task being the purely technical one of restoring on the ground the boundary delimited and demarcated in 1914, in the light of the documents and the maps prepared by the Commission of that year and of any authenticated pillars still traceable on the ground)?

P.L.S.

156/14/42

H. E. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis,
K.C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.,
✓ H. E. H's Ambassador.

262/43 / 41
3.2

Iran: Kurds 152/153/42

TELEGRAM.

How Sent
Parap

From: H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

To: H.M. Charge d'Affaires
Tehran.

Copies

Date 14.6.42

Sent To:

Time Despatched 18.25 hrs

No. 160

X A.O.C.

X G.O.C.

X C.I.C.I.

x *Semi 15/6*

IMPORTANT.

Addressed to TEHRAN NO.160

repeated to Foreign Office No.611
Kermanshah No.17
Minister of State Cairo No.227.

Your No.211.

I agree that it is important to render Hama Rashid harmless and I am pressing Iraq Government to take action. I will wire details when matter is arranged. As Hama Rashid was once before kept for four years under detention in Mosul at instance of Persian Government it may be difficult to hook him again.

2. Jaf tribesmen are evidently moving across the frontier to their traditional summer pastures. Persian authorities under late regime placed embargo on this movement during last few years but Iraqi Government on good grounds have always maintained that this action was unjust and have constantly sought to maintain right of Jaf to migrate.

3. Movement is with women, children and flocks and in this state tribe is too vulnerable to be likely to join Hama Rashid in fighting against Persian troops.

CORNWALLIS.

VH/KC
GDAM/JLP
MWR/RK

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152

Tehran: Kurds

152/152/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received.

CODE

x
Sent
15/6

From : H.M. CONSUL,
KERMANS SHAH.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

Copies to : x G.O.C.
x A.O.C.
x C.I.C.I.

Despatched : 14.6.42 (1600)
Received : 15.6.42 (0730)
Decyphered : 15.6.42 (0920)

No. 39 of 13.6.42

152/148/42 }
@ = w.g.

152/150/42 }

RD
RK
RK

Kermanshah @ telegram No. 38.

Present position covered by Tehran
telegram No. 211 of June 11th to Bagdad.

Nothing further to report.

[HAMA RASHID]
....

+ 14756

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Iran: Kurds

152/151/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received.

PARAP

From: Mr. Holman,
Tehran.

To: H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

Copies to:

G.O.C.
A.O.C.
C.I.C.I.

Despatched: 13/6/42, 14.00 hrs.

Received: 14/6/42, 21.00 "

Decyphered: " 10.20 "

No. 213

of 12th June, 1942

Addressed to BAGDAD (for G.O.C.) No. 213

Repeated to Foreign Office,
Minister of State,
Government of India.

Foreign Office telegram No. 881 to me.

Our view here is that if it appears that a situation is likely to arise which would seriously affect our military interests, we should be in time to prevent it. We realise, however, your natural anxiety to avoid trouble and would only recommend intervention if serious trouble were obviously unavoidable. Do you agree with this ++ principle?

2. Persian army has done unexpectedly well and there is no reason to anticipate trouble at present in any particular area, but we are most anxious to see Hama Rashid kept in Iraq. This would be a most desirable measure of insurance against serious trouble later in an area where it would be awkward to deal with it.

SMK/JAM
JM
MR

He ✓
Ency 19/6
17/6 16/6
✓

This is addressed
to G.O.C.

14/6/42

INDEX

off
tel

1 do not think we should delay consideration until Tuesday - my feeling is that Hama Rashid should be rendered harmless without further delay. A report of Lt. Fletcher which I read today shows how unreliable he is. He has apparently failed to join the 14th pat. & taking of the Kurds themselves & has become a pretty dangerous nuisance. He is, it is evident, a matter of concern to our military authorities & we should do our best to help them.

The 14th pat. you are understanding that if he came into 14th, he would be removed from the position. I doubt whether this should be done - indeed Mr. Edwards wrote in his account of his recent journey to Kurdistan "I have little doubt that Hama Rashid did come over to his village in 14th two or three times during these latter but not with armed bands escaping pursuit. The 14th authorities know that he was fighting his Persians. Why then did they not get hold of him?"

I think we should insist that the 14th take extra precautions to watch for him & to remove him from the position if he comes into 14th. I do not believe that the 14th will accept the suggestion

Tel

of the 70. That they should warn him that he
 will be out-lawed & his property confiscated
 if he does not return to my now do I
 think we should make such a suggestion
 while negotiations are still taking place.
 (see 211) - But it is obvious that there
 will be a better chance of the kinds of
 the P. G. coming to terms if Hanna Ruschik
 is not of the picture & there may be some
 other way, short of the above, of persuading
 to come back to my. I shall let you
 to consult Mr. Edwards regarding what
 this & I shall let you to see him myself.
 we cannot afford to have our military
 position jeopardized by a man like H.R.
 2. I thought that the last migration had
 been stopped by the P. G. several years
 ago. Please find out what the
 position is this year & whether there
 is any suspicion that they might cause
 trouble by joining H.R. or in other
 ways if they go across -

W.L.

13.6

TELEGRAM.

How received.

PARAP

X
Sent 13/6From : H.M. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
TEHRAN. BAGDAD.Copies to : X G.O.C. Despatched : 12.6.42 (1330)
X A.O.C. Received : 13.6.42 (0730)
X C.I.C.I. Decyphered : 13.6.42 (0930)

No. 211 of 11.6.42

IMPORTANT.Addressed to Bagdad No.211,
rptd toF.O.
Kermanshah,
Minister of State Cairo Saving,
India Saving.

Your telegrams Nos. 152 and 157.

According to General Shahbakhti, who is
now in Tehran, Hama Rashid is at present on the Iranian
side of the Iraqi frontier with 40 to 60 men.2. Iranian forces are at Saqqiz where
civil administration is re-established but not at Bana.
The Military attache confirms this. Kermanshah telegram
No. 80 to Tehran, second paragraph should read "ten miles
east of Bana".3. Hama Rashid has been told amnieh and
Bakshdars might be Kurdish but no other officials.
If he refuses this offer, which seems fair (for
comments see my despatch No. 181 to the Foreign
Office, copy sent you June 9th by air) Shahbakhti
proposes to take further military measures. Hama
Rashid has not surrendered or made his peace with
the Iranian Government.4. We are unable to confirm whether a Kurd
has been appointed to Bakshdar of Bana or not.
Shahbakhti was vague.5. Shahbakhti complained again of the
great assistance given to Hama Rashid from Iraq.
Penjwin authorities might he said have detained
him and he was anxious that they should now at
least restrain the Jaf tribesmen from crossing the
frontier to join him. It appears essential for the
restoration of peace, in an area which is becoming
of increasing importance to us, that the Iraqi
authorities should assist us to get Hama Rashid
back to Iraq and keep him there as suggested in
Foreign Office telegram No. 559 to Bagdad.*The Jaf are I suppose
making their normal
migration. I doubt if
they have any intention of*CW/JP
RK
RK**INDEX**

joining Hama Rasid.

TELEGRAM

As regards H R

himself, I still feel

that all that can properly

be done is to remove him

from the frontier if he is

pushed across, but as you

know Mr Edmunds feels

that it is not proper to

do this ^{even} unless if there has

been a settlement between H R

& the Government before he

withdraws

Can we hold up a reply

until after discussion with

Mr Edmunds on Tuesday next?

NA 13/6

152

Iran: Kurds

152/149/42

To: British Embassy, Bagdad (3)

For G.O.C. and C.I.C.I. → sent

No: 43(22/149/42)

With the compliments of
The British Legation

Q. 12/6

No. 181
(22/149/42)

9th June, 1942.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of an interesting report by Colonel Fletcher, Political Adviser at Kermanshah, together with a covering letter from His Majesty's Consul, regarding a visit which Colonel Fletcher recently paid to Sanandaj and Saqqiz. The annex to Colonel Fletcher's report is not enclosed.

2. Since this report was written the question of our taking action to keep Hama Rashid in Iraq has been dealt with in telegraphic correspondence with the Foreign Office and Bagdad. The appointment of foreign advisers, which is also mentioned by Colonel Fletcher, has also come under active consideration, both here, in London and in Washington. I support Colonel Fletcher's recommendations about measures to be taken on the Iraqi side of the frontier to prevent help being given to the rebellious Kurds. A column of British troops has recently moved through Panjvin and it is to be hoped that it will have had some local effect. Whatever view one may take of Kurdish aspirations in general, it seems, I think, definitely undesirable that support should be given to Hama Rashid from across the frontier, and the sooner he is eliminated as a disturbing factor in this area, the better for all concerned, both Kurds and Persians.

3. As regards tribal grievances in Kurdistan, Mr. Vaughan-Russell remarks in his covering letter that no comprehensive programme has yet been made known to the Kurds, showing what reforms it is proposed to introduce in Kurdistan. The Tribal Commission to remedy grievances over tribal lands is, however, now sitting and its proceedings are being actively followed by Colonel Galloway, attached to this Legation. The Persian Government had pamphlets dropped from the air in Kurdistan to ensure that the establishment of the Commission should be known. Both the Oriental Secretary, Mr. Trott, and Mr. Squire, Counsellor at this Legation, have recently visited Kermanshah at the request of His Majesty's Minister, with a view to examining what grievances now exist in Kurdistan. A number of necessary local administrative changes were made by direct approach to the Minister of the Interior as a result of Mr. Trott's visit. Mr. Squire was principally concerned with the question of tribal lands and he reports that, except for the Shahabad area, which is being dealt with in another despatch, Kurdish grievances as we understand them are mainly of general neglect and mal-administration. There seem to be no land grievances in the North requiring investigation.

4. As regards the general grievances of mal-administration, I propose to ignore so far as possible grievances arising out of the past and to concentrate on grievances arising in the present and future. It seems possible that one of the main grievances, namely the illegal exactions of the Gendarmerie (Amniah) may be met by the recruitment of Kurdish Gendarmerie and possibly also by the appointment of more Kurdish Bakhshdars (Heads of Communes). General /Shahbakhti

The Right Honourable
Anthony Eden, P.C., M.C., M.P.,
Etc., Etc., Etc.,
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

INDEX

Handwritten signatures and initials:
H. L. L.
C. S. S.
J. S. S.
13/6

Shahbakhti has, on the authority of the Persian Government and with the encouragement of Colonel Fletcher, already made this proposal in Kurdistan. I doubt whether this will effect any great improvement, as honesty is probably as rare among the Kurds as among the Persians, and in one locality at least local Kurds have requested the removal of a Kurdish official in favour of a Persian. Nevertheless, such a proposal clearly prevents the question of local mal-administration assuming a racial aspect. The Persian Government are opposed to committing themselves to all officials being Kurds, and to public instruction being handed over entirely.

5. In general, I propose to support General Shahbakhti who alone seems capable of maintaining order, subject of course to his administration being reasonably enlightened and provided that he continues to enjoy the confidence of the Persian Government. I hope that by suitable discreet local action we may be able to effect some improvement in local government in this area. I propose to get severe action against any local official against whom charges of corruption and extortion can be brought home. If and when it becomes known that such officials as meet with our displeasure by their dishonesty or mal-administration get dismissed from their posts, it should help considerably to make the administration more honest and efficient and should also raise our prestige among the people.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch with its enclosures to the British Embassy Bagdad, to the Minister of State, to the Government of India and His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah.

I have the honour to be with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) A. HOLMAN

No. 13A/PA.
KERMANSHAH,
13th May 1942.

To:- G.S. Branch,
H.Q. Tenth Army,
BAGHDAD.

From:-
Political Adviser,
KERMANSHAH.

Subject:- KURDISTAN.

On the 5th May I visited SENANDAJ and saw General SHAHBAKTI, who said that HAMA RASHID had been recently to Iraq more than once, that the Iraqi Mudir at PENJWIN was in league with him and that the Iraqi Government had not fulfilled its promises of preventing his return to PERSIA should the Persian forces succeed in driving him out. General Shahbakti outwardly welcomed the idea that I should go to SAKIZ and he said he would order Brigadier ARFAA to meet me there.

2. I left for SAKIZ on the 6th May. At MIRANSHAH (J-38W J 1006), I met MOHAMMAD KHAN HABIBI, brother of the late ALI KHAN HABIBI of the TILEKUR tribe, who is now Bakshdar of MIRANSHAH. He was wearing Persian military uniform and a medal but had no badges of rank. He was friendly but did not strike me as having much character or personlity. This impression was confirmed by what I heard about him later. In SAHIB there is a garrison of Persian soldiers. Similarly in DIWAN DARREH there is half a regiment and its commander Major ROKNI, said he was awaiting the arrival of the rest of his unit when he would be moving forward. There are also a few troops in BAKLA (138F W9411). In SAKIZ there are no troops except a few men of the Persian Supply service. En route I overtook a couple of lorries between DIWAN DARREH and SAKIZ going north with troops and I met a couple similarly loaded coming in the opposite direction.

3. The Bakshdar of SAKIZ, SAIFULLAH KHAN ARDALAN, who remained there after the capture of SAKIZ by HAMA RASHID, received me and was extremely friendly. The bazaar had been completely and wantonly looted by HAMA RASHID'S men. One shop in ten was open. I was told that the population of the town was normally eleven to twelve thousand, and that about half the inhabitants had returned. Up to a week or so prior to my visit the town had been deserted. The excellent school building, the new hospital, and the municipality building had been looted. All doors, window frames, electric wires, and even brick tiles off the floors had been carried off. In the school even the black boards let into the wall had been smashed and carried off. The local director of Education, FARJAD, a Persian, had returned the day before to open the school again. On the school wall I noticed anti-HAMA RASHID slogans written up by some of the boys. On the wall of the house where I was accommodated I noticed a similar slogan in the same writing. This may have been a little propaganda for the benefit of Shahbakti and the Ustandar who had visited the town a few days previously. I also saw the remains of the house of Major ZAGROS, himself an inhabitant of SAKIZ, who commanded the force which was attacked and defeated by HAMA RASHIDS men. It had been burnt. ZAGROS IS now in Senandaj. General AMINI, was, I'm told, killed on the bridge on the outskirts of the town. All the Kurds whom I met on the road and SAKIZ, with a few exceptions, complained most bitterly of the behaviour of HAMA RASHID. The exceptions were people from SUNATEH (J-38W H 9206), which was a village which supported HAMA RASHID. They complained of looting by Persian troops and Tilekuri tribesmen, who were supporting the Government - Apart from these people I only met Kurds who had either remained neutral or had been supporting the Government. The Persian troops seem to have behaved fairly well, though, while hostilities were in progress round SAKIZ, sheep, eggs and fowls were taken without payment and in SAHIB, the doors and beams of some houses were removed for firewood. ARFAA, now a Brigadier, came to SAKIZ to meet me. I met him on the 7th and went with him to his H.Q. at MIRANSHAH (J 38W H510/), where I spent a night. He had a battalion on top of a peak on the north of the road near MATRU (J 38W H5309)

(J 38W H 5309). The rest of his troops are at KAL-I-KHAN (J 38 V 8791), which is the pass on the road to BANEH. BANEH had never been occupied by Persian troops, but a reconnaissance by tanks and armoured cars was made. ARFAA gave the strength of his forces as about 3,000 men, 8 tanks and some A.C.S. 2 tanks are in SENANDAJ or KERMANAHAN. He wanted me to ride out to see his troops on the KAL-I-KHAN but I had no time to do so. The road over the pass is still very difficult for motor ~~xxx~~ traffic. He gave me a detailed account of the operations of the last month, which I took down and add as an appendix to this report. His statement that HAMA RASHID has twice visited WAINA in IRAQ and was still telling people that he had the support of the British was confirmed by local Kurds. HAMA RASHID is at NAMSHIR (J 38V H2302) with about 600 men. He had ordered the inhabitants of BANEH to leave the town and, when ARFAA went there, he found only about 30 inhabitants. I met refugees from BANEH, which had been looted. They complained bitterly of the behaviour of HAMA RASHID and his men. ARFAA said he was in favour of a peaceful settlement. In his opinion HAMA RASHID would not stage another attack in force but would confine himself to guerilla tactics in the wooded country round BANEH where it would be very difficult to capture him. I was present while ARFAA interviewed the head of his secret service and two refugees from BANEH, to whom he gave money. The secret service man said that Iraqi police had visited the area round the SHALAR river (138 D V 82) and had told Iraqi Kurds to go to HAMA RASHID's assistance. Some were responding. This of course may have been staged for my benefit. It is, however, evident that HAMA RASHID is out for himself, is preventing other Kurdish leaders from submitting, and is still trying to get support by claiming that he has British assistance. Negotiations are now in progress but unless HAMA RASHID is eliminated I see little hope of lasting peace. HAMA RASHID broke his word to us not to advance south of the QIZIL USUN river and is a brigand without honour or principles. Without him the northern Kurds would probably come to terms.

4. When I was in SAKIZ, SHEIKH SEYYID MOHAMMAD NURANI ZANBILI, nephew of HAJI BABA SHEIKH, arrived bearing HAMA RASHID'S terms for submission. KAKULLAH and BAIZID AGHA, chiefs of the MAHABAD section of the GUREK tribe were also there. KARANNI AGHA, an old man of about 70, chief of the MANISH tribe, was in SENANDAJ, and so was ALI ILKHANI ZADEH, AMIR ASSAD, chief of the DEHBUKRI tribes, and who was made Farmandar of MAHABAD at SHAHBAKHTI'S instance. I met I met the latter in SAKIZ. He told me that HAMA RASHID would not listen to reason, that he still claimed to have British backing, had looted disgracefully, and kept the loot for himself. He also said that the Russians were not encouraging HAMA RASHID. AMIR ASSAD was one of the chiefs invited to BAKU. He first received the ~~message~~ invitation when he and a few other chiefs were awaiting a message from HAMA RASHID. When they said they could not go as they were waiting for a message from one of their chiefs the Russians said that of course it must be a British representative for whom they were waiting. According to him the Russians do not want Kurdish chiefs to be too friendly with the British, but want them to be more friendly with the Russians. The Russians do not care much for SHAHBAKHTI as they think he is too friendly with us. The Russians came to MAHABAD where there was a meeting of the Kurdish chiefs to decide on their attitude to the Persian Government. The Kurdish chiefs failed to agree and 34 went with the Russians to BAKU where they were very well received. They were addressed by MIRZA JAFFAR BAGROFF, RAHBAR of the Caucasus, who told them that Russia favoured the freedom of all small nations, that the present time was not favourable for Kurdish independence, that the Kurds must wait and that both Russia and England were sympathetic towards the Kurds. Several of the Kurdish chiefs said they wanted independence at once and asked for Russian assistance. MIRZA JAFFAR laughed at them. AMIR ASSAD said that recently a Russian colonel and two assistants had arrived at MAHABAD to buy horses and that the colonel did not want the Persian Government to know about it. Apart from these men there were no Russians there, though sometimes Russians visited the area. Incidentally I also was told by local people, including the Bakhsdar of SAKIZ that the Russians were buying

wheat

wheat round MAHABAD and BIJAR. AMIR ASSAD struck me as a sensible man. His views were as follows:- it is useless for the Kurds to think of independence now. They must submit to Persian rule, but must achieve unity among themselves in order to resist oppression. After the war perhaps something will be done for them at the peace conference. If not it can't be helped. I did not see KARANNI AGHA but I gather that his views are the same.

5. SHEIKH SEYYID MOHAMMAD NURANI ZANBILI is on bad terms with his uncle, HAJI BABA SHEIKH, who, after receiving many favours from the ex-Shah, is now apparently against the Persian Government. He brought the following terms from HAMA RASHID, which were given me by ARFAA:-

- (a) Either HAMA RASHID or a Kurd of whom he approved to be Bakhshdar of BANEH.
- (b) BANEH to control the amish in BANEH and SAKKIZ areas. These amish to be Kurds.
- (c) SAKKIZ and BANEH to be administered on the same lines as MAHABAD, where a Kurd, AMIR ASSAD, is Faramandar.
- (d) SAKKIZ to have a Kurdish Bakhshdar as at present, i.e., SAIFULLAH KHAN ARDALAN.
- (e) Hostages to be given by HAMA RASHID to the Persians. They are to be either the brother, MOHAMMAD AMIN, or the son of HAMA RASHID and a brother of SALIM KHAN, KEMRADEH of BANEH, who is at present with HAMA RASHID.
- (f) Persian troops to be withdrawn East of the KHUR KHURREH river (i.e., between SAHIB and MIRANSHAH) as the Kurds are afraid of them.

ARFAA telegraphed the terms to SHSHBAKHTI, and told me that SHSHBAKHTI had agreed to HAMA RASHID being Bakhshdar of BANEH, and to other terms except (f). SHSHBAKHTI would however await the arrival of the Minister of War who is shortly expected from REZAIEN, before coming to a definite decision. I was surprised that SHSHBAKHTI should have agreed to this appointment of HAMA RASHID as the man's word is worthless. It appears that ARFAA was lying for, on my return to KERMANSHAH, SHSHBAKHTI told me that he would not have HAMA RASHID as Bakhshdar but would accept SALIM. SHSHBAKHTI also laid great emphasis on the necessity for a Persian garrison in SAKKIZ.

6. In SAKKIZ the only officials functioning were the Bakhshdar, the local official of the Tobacco Monopoly (both Kurds), and the Director of Education, a Persian. There were two policemen in the town and I was told that a Chief of Police is coming from REZAIEN. It is not known whether he is a Kurd or not. A police force is also to be sent up. The amish for the SAKKIZ area are to be Kurds and SHSHBAKHTI has proposed that they should not wear the blue uniform so closely associated by the local populace with the worst acts of oppression under the last régime, but should only have a metal badge. He also proposes that they should be under the control of the Bakhshdar of SAKKIZ and MIRANSHAH. I saw three amish between SAKKIZ and MIRANSHAH. One had forcibly taken a horse from a village and had compelled another villager to accompany him. The matter is being dealt with by the Persian authorities. In BIWAN DAREH there are about 30 amish, all in blue uniform. There are also amish posts at BAKLA (153 F W 9411), NAJAFABAD (153F X0735) and HUSAINABAD (153F W9305). Amish posts along the road between SENANAJ and KERMANSHAH have been strengthened and there are complaints of illtreatment of villagers. ARFAA told me that a Persian Captain had been put in charge of the tribal area South of SAHIB.

7. I left MIRADDEH on the 7th May, arrived in SENANAJ on the 8th and reached KERMANSHAH on the 9th. The delay in sending the report is due to the necessity of dealing with trouble over the feeding arrangements of Persian labourers in PATAK and the threatened desertion of labourers.

8. CONCLUSIONS.

- (a) HAMA RASHID attacked the Persians at SAKKIZ and not vice-versa (see Appendix to this report).
- (b) The majority of the Kurds are ready to come to terms but HAMA RASHID is preventing them.
- (c) HAMA RASHID's aim is self aggrandisement and looting. He is thoroughly unreliable and any promises he may make are unlikely to be kept. If given position of influence he is likely to use it to collect more forces and again attack the Persians.
- (d) HAMA RASHID is still spreading stories of British support and is intriguing with Iraqi Kurds, some of whom have crossed the frontier to join him.
- (e) The Russians are not supporting the Kurdish rebels.
- (f) The treatment of the Kurdish population by HAMA RASHID has been worse than their treatment by the Persians.
- (g) Persian terms are reasonable except that I consider, that if HAMA RASHID's influence can be eliminated, no garrison should be kept in SAKKIZ.
- (h) The local Iraqi officials at PANJVIN and possibly HALABJA (both SHAHBAKHTI and ARFAA mentioned the latter place) are secretly helping HAMA RASHID, who has twice been to WAINA (see Appendix to this report).

9. RECOMMENDATIONS.

- (i) The P. A. KIRKUK should visit PANJVIN and HALABJA and, if the complicity of the Iraqi Officials there is proved, they should be severely dealt with.
- (ii) A small force of British troops should go to PANJVIN as soon as possible.
- (iii) SHAHBAKHTI's proposals for the settlement of the trouble should be accepted but Persian troops should not be stationed North of SENANDAJ since HAMA RASHID has either been captured or caught in IRAQ. SAKKIZ is a small town and a garrison of one brigade is too big and will only oppress the people. The less the people see of the military the more likely they are to live peacefully under Persian rule.
- (iv) Persian military officers put in charge of tribal areas should be withdrawn as soon as possible.
- (v) SHAHBAKHTI should be told not to send officers such as Major ISFANDIAR KHAN SAYYID to negotiate with the Kurds. H.M. Consul has already received a complaint against this man. The employment of such officers known to the Kurds for their past brutality is a great mistake and will increase Kurdish reluctance to come to terms.
- (vi) Steps should be taken to deport to Persia a Persian subject named ABDUL RAHMAN living in SULAIMANIYEH, who is alleged to act as HAMA RASHID's agent, receive loot from him and bribe Iraqi frontier officials.
- (vii) Some of the MARIVAN leaders were invited by SHAHBAKHTI to meet him in SENANDAJ but refused as they were afraid of being seized. They would probably come if we guaranteed their safe return. This might be considered as, if the MARIVAN Kurds do not open negotiations, there may well be further hostilities in that area.

(Sgd.) A. W. FLETCHER,
Lt. Colonel,
Political Adviser.

Copy.

850/18/2/1.

CONFIDENTIAL.

British Consulate,
Kermanshah,
May 19th, 1942.

Dear Chancery,

Although the Military Attaché has doubtless shewn you his copy of the Political Adviser's report of his recent journey to Kurdistan, I enclose herewith one of the copies of the report sent to me by Lieut-Colonel Fletcher. As might be expected of a report drawn up primarily for the information of the 10th Army H.Q., it contains a wealth of detail regarding questions of military interest; at the same time, it is valuable for its interesting conclusions and recommendations, based on first hand information gleaned from reliable sources.

2. Although accumulating evidence appears to show that HAMA Rashid and his supporters have been just as guilty of looting and cruelty as the Persian soldiery, I consider that it is not yet possible to express an impartial opinion about HAMA RASHID and his recent activities. The full truth cannot yet be known and it is, I believe, still too soon to brand HAMA RASHID as an out-and-out brigand whose activities have been inspired solely by the desire to sack Kurdistan for his own personal benefit. The case against him certainly looks black, but I feel that the fact should be placed on record that many Kurds certainly regarded him as the champion upon whom all Kurdish hopes were centred - hopes of obtaining better treatment at the hands of corrupt and cruel Persian Military governors. Had his revolt succeeded, he would doubtless have been acclaimed as a Kurdish national hero and his exactions would have soon been overlooked and forgiven. In his time of adversity it is not surprising that Persians and many Kurds describe him as a mere brigand.

3. It is clear that HAMA RASHID has been defeated and that Kurdish resistance has now been broken, at least for the present. Sardasht, Banah, Avroman and Kerivan appear to be the only areas in which Iranian Government Authority remains to be re-established and, now that HAMA Rashid is seeking terms upon which he can surrender, serious resistance in the above-mentioned areas is not likely to be encountered - unless of course, the Iranian soldiery commit excesses and the Iranian Government imposes unreasonable and harsh terms upon the Kurdish population which has again come under its control. There are fortunately, indications that the Iranian Military and Civil Authorities realise the need for treating the Kurds reasonably and not too harshly, but no comprehensive programme has yet been made known to the Kurds, showing what reforms it is proposed to introduce in Kurdistan. If the more important causes of past Kurdish discontent can be removed and if the Iranian Government can take prompt measures to show the Kurds that it is really anxious to improve conditions in Kurdistan, we may soon see the disappearance of any lingering desire which some Kurds may still cherish, to struggle on until all Kurdish grievances are redressed.

4. The problem of dealing with HAMA RASHID may cause the Iranian authorities some difficulty. It seems hardly likely that this ringleader of the revolt will be appointed Bakhsdar of Banah; indeed, it will be surprising if General Shahbakhti will consent to his returning to Iran at all, for Shahbakhti is known to favour the purchase by the Iranian Government of all HAMA RASHID'S lands and property in Iran and the permanent settlement of HAMA RASHID up on his estates in Iraq. Such a solution may well be the one ultimately suggested, but the Iraq Government may feel it necessary to make some comments or raise objections to such a solution, which nevertheless has some points in its favour.

5. For my part, I venture to make one additional suggestion for furthering peace and order in Kurdistan, viz : that, to supplement the inexperienced Kurdish officials which will inevitably be appointed to posts in Kurdistan, the Iranian Government should send to Kurdistan the best officials that it can muster. What I consider really necessary (not only in Kurdistan, but throughout the country) is the appointment of a number of foreign advisers and inspectors by the Iranian Government, to supervise the activities of all government officials both in the Ministries and in the Provincial offices. If foreign inspectors were appointed and they were granted wide powers, more efficiency and less corruption would soon be encountered in Iranian administrative circles and the population, especially tribesmen like the Kurds and Lurs, would be less likely to feel the urge to revolt against the Central Government. While Belgians supervised the Iranian Customs Administration and Swedes organised the Gendarmerie in Iran, the population here had less cause for complaint than it has at present. At the risk of hurting the feelings of Iranians (who wrongly believe that they can "run their own show" properly without foreign advice or assistance), I consider that the Iranian Government should be urged to engage the services of a number of foreign advisers and inspectors. Unless foreign officials are employed by the Iranian Government, it is to be feared that corruption, tyranny and inefficiency will continue to flourish among all Iranian Government officials and that the tribal populations will always be on the look-out for opportunities to avenge themselves for the wrongs and injustices suffered by them and be a potential menace to the peace of the country. I fully realise that it may at present be inopportune or impracticable to urge upon the Iranian Government the adoption of the suggestions briefly described above. I am nevertheless convinced that the proposals themselves offer the best solution for the problem of maintaining security and prosperity in Iran.

Yours ever,

Signed/- J.R. Vaughan Russell

H. B. M. Consul.

Copy sent to :-

G.O.C. 6th Indian Division,
P. A. Kermanshah
A. L. O. Kermanshah.

Iran Kurds 152/148/42

TELEGRAM.

How received.

PARAP

x Sent
9/6

From : H.M. CONSUL, KERMANSHAH. To : H. M. AMBASSADOR, BAGDAD.

Copies to : x G.O.C. Despatched : 9.6.42 (0830)
x A.O.C. Received : 9.6.42 (1900)
x C.I.C.I. Decyphered : 9.6.42 (2015)

No. 38 of 8.6.42

rptd to

Addressed to TEHRAN NO.80,

Bagdad,
F.O. 33,
Cairo 29.

Bagdad telegram No.152, June 2nd.

Iranian military authorities state that Hama Rashid has not surrendered and has put forward conditions which are now being examined in Tehran. Some of these are apparently unacceptable.

2. He has asked for official posts for his friends but not for himself. The Iranian authorities appear to be unwilling to offer him official post owing to his alleged Iraqi nationality and unreliability.

3. Iranian forces are said to be stationed in the valley ten miles east of Baneh. Colonel commanding here professes to find the present situation satisfactory and fighting as good as finished although Hama Rashid still has possibly 200 men with him in the mountains. General Shahbakhti has been in Tehran since before my arrival here ten days ago and is no doubt discussing conditions above-mentioned.

...

NO *of the local Persian*
Gen finds the present
situation at Baneh satisfactory
there seems to be no need
for action by Iraq, Gen
Thorn's reaction from Tehran?

INDEX

JM/JAM
RK
RK

Lib with

A.B

Q10/6

Yes we 10.6 1076

Iran: Kurds.

152/147/42

TELEGRAM.

How Sent

PARAP

From : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

To: H.M.MINISTER TEHRAN.

Copies

Date 8.6.42

Sent To:

No. 157

Time Despatched 1930/8/June.

X GOC
X AOC
X CICI
with
/145/
X Sent
9/6

Addressed to TEHRAN NO.157,
rptd to
F.O. No. 594,
Minister of State Cairo No.216,
Kermanshah No.16.

Your telegram No. 196.

Please see my telegram No. 152.

I should be grateful if you could give me definite information of position of Hama Rashid vis-a-vis the Persian Government. Reports from frontier area indicate that following agreement with local chiefs peace has been restored in Bana and Saqqiz areas and that Hama Rashid has dispersed his following. If this is so action proposed on the assumption that he was still on the war path with 200 men may no longer be appropriate.

= CORNWALLIS =

INDEX

VH/KC

JM/mn
RK
RK

152 | 140 |
146 | 42

152

Iran Kurds: 152/146/42

TELEGRAM.

How received.

From : FOREIGN OFFICE,
LONDON.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

PARAP

x Semi
86 Rn

Copies to : *x*G.O.C.
*x*A.O.C.
*x*C.I.C.I.

Despatched : 6.6. 1935
Received : 7.6. 1200
Decyphered : 7.6. 1900

No. 573

of 5th June, 1942.

Addressed to TEHRAN No. 881 of June 5th.

Rptd. Minister of State, Cairo.
Bagdad for G.O.C.
Government of India.

Your telegram No. 684.

I approve the action reported in paragraph 1 of your telegram and rely on your calling on everything possible to see that the Iranian Government give effect to their promises to remedy the tribal grievances.

2. There may be circumstances in which British troops would have to intervene to assist the Iranian Army to deal with rebellious tribesmen, especially if the latter refused to accept the settlement with the Iranian Government on the terms which we regarded as fair, and if the Iranian army were unable to cope with the situation. It is difficult to lay down in advance the circumstances in which our intervention in support of the Iranian Army should be accorded, in our view it would be best to say nothing on the subject to the Iranian Government at present. But I think it would be well to consider now whether such intervention should only take place in the last resort, or whether it would forestall serious trouble if we could intervene at an earlier stage and before the situation had deteriorated. I should be glad if you will consider this question of principle in consultation with the G.O.C. and report your views.

GDM/JM
JB
RK

.....
Plant *8/11/42*
W
10.6
11/7/42

Copy aa

Tel

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152

Iran Kurds 152/145/42

TELEGRAM.

How received.

CODE

From : Mr . Holman,
Tehran.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

Copies to : x GR
x CIC
x AOL

Despatched : 5/6/42,
Received : 6/6/42,
Decyphered : /" , 09.45 hrs.

x See
152/147/42
Ru

No. 196

of 5th June, 1942

Addressed to BAGDAD No. 196.

Repeated to Foreign Office,
Minister of State,
Kermanshah.

Foreign Office telegram No. 559 to you.

I trust that this warning will be issued
with as little delay as possible.

MW/GDM
JM
RK

-/136/-

7-140/-

Come to
GOC
AOC
CIC
/147/

HA/v This is dated May 5th
but it takes no notice of
our tel sent on ^{June} May 2nd (a/-/144/-)
Shall we wait for
a reply or ask for it?

HA 9/6

or.
I think we had better refer to it &
say we need definite information about
the position of H. Rashid with view to
Parisians. The situation is far from clear
of last C.D. report.

INDEX

we
7.6

Done -/147/-

Iran: Kurds. 152/144/42

TELEGRAM.

How Sent

**PARAP
DIRECT**

Copies

Sent To:-

G. O. C.
A. O. C.
CICI.

From : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

To: H.M. Charge d'Affaires,
Tehran.

Date 4th June, 1942.

Time Despatched 13.15 hrs, 5/6

No. 154

Right of Herki to cross frontier to reach their customary summer pastures was confirmed by demarcation commission of 1914 and they would suffer great hardship if kept in the plains. Figure of 8000 must include women and children a fair estimate of number of men would not exceed 400.

They have taken no more arms with them than they have ordinarily in Iraq and Iraqi authorities have had no trouble with them for years. Neither Soviet nor Persian authorities need therefore fear that Herki will cause difficulties provided they are tactfully handled and their access to their grazing grounds is not obstructed.

CORNWALLIS.

VH/KC
JAM
JM
TU

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152
To: H.M. Ambassador

B A G H D A D



No. 40 (144/156/42) of the

1st June, 1942.

Tabriz despatch No.15,
(Confidential)

With the compliments of

H.M. Representative,

T E H R A N.

noted

Mr Edwards

HC
Curry
1/20/42
British Legation, Tehran,

1st June, 1942

1576
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Jean Kurdo

152/143/42

No. 15.

British Consulate General,

Confidential.

Tabriz, 24th May, 1942.

Sir,

The reports about trouble with the Kurds in Western Azerbaijan which began to reach Tabriz from the 28th April onwards were alarmist, often contradictory, and generally unreliable. It was clearly desirable that I should go to Meshik as soon as possible and see what was actually happening but I decided not to rush into the middle of the matter too quickly. One of my reasons for so deciding was that both the Russians and the Persians were eyeing the new British Consul-General with something more than an innocent curiosity, and it would have been only too easy in the first days after my arrival to create an impression, possibly difficult to correct later, that my soul had a bias for one side or the other. In particular I feared that the Russians would be suspicious of a visit to Meshik at a time when the Persians were claiming that what was to be seen there was the proof that the Russians were trying to detach Western Azerbaijan, at the time too when the Russian Consul General had very properly gone there to try to improve the link between the Russian military and the local civil authorities. While I had no intention of surrendering my right to travel in my district freely, it seemed good to me to find a normal excuse for making the journey and the arrival of the new Governor-General provided it. He asked me to allow him a few days to take up his functions and then, after an exchange of plain language telegrams which would, I knew, be read by persons interested in my movements, I went to Meshik on May 15th. I had intended to return on the 19th, but I stayed one day longer in the hope of being able to report the beginning of a movement of the refugees back to their villages.

2. I offered a seat in my car to my United States colleague, whose own car has not yet arrived, but he did not accept.

3. My visit was an interesting one and I hope useful. I propose to submit a detailed account as soon as possible but so much of my time is taken up with cyphering and office work that it may be delayed. I am therefore giving you now my main conclusions. Before doing so, however, I think it will be useful to describe briefly the background against which these recent events have taken place, and the present atmosphere.

4. It is vividly within living memory that the last war brought the Russians and the Turks into conflict in Azerbaijan, that disorders ensued in which the civilian population suffered, the Christians particularly. The local officials of the two countries are distrustful of each other today and the public cannot fail to know it. To the ordinary man there is nothing far-fetched in the idea that they may again be fighting one another, and that the civilians will again run the risk of massacre. Whatever his race or religion the ordinary man in these parts is fear-ridden, easily startled by rumour. If he is a Shi'ah he is a peevish specimen, morally and physically, probably an opium smoker, and abject coward unless he is overwhelmingly strong and then he shows all the violent brutality of the coward. If he is a Christian, whether Armenian or Assyrian, he has behind him three or four generations of the decline of his people in this region, of suffering and massacre at the hands of Turks, Kurds and Persians. If he is a Kurd, he knows that his people cannot stand up to the Mustapha Kemal and the Reza Shahs, that though the present offers a chance for some

/to

His Majesty's Minister,
British Legation,
TEHRAN.

to wipe off old scores with the gendarmes, to pillage, and even to talk insolently to the Persian officials in the jargon which some of the have learned at Baku, the future is very uncertain. Indeed all of them see the future as uncertain and dangerous because all of them think there is a strong chance that the Germans will break through on the Caucasus front, that the Russians will have to leave and that there will be a period when anything might happen before the Persians, with German help get firm control and put the Kurds and Christians back where they were, under the gendarmes.

5. It only made matters worse that many civilians were able to acquire Persian army rifles and ammunition. Although no doubt the Kurds are better armed than the others, all of them have weapons and all of them consider that what is a measure of prudent precaution for their sect is an act of aggression when others do likewise; this is particularly the case as between the Kurds and the Shiaks who circulate, and end by believing, very exaggerated tales about the arsenals held by the other.

6. In these circumstances the recent Kurdish outbreak has had an emotional effect out of proportion with the number of Kurds involved, the numbers killed and the damage done. They are circumstances in which it is difficult to form a sane and balanced judgment, hence, I think, the extravagances of my Turkish colleagues and the violent folly of Persian officers like Serhang Hashimi. Indeed, almost any foolishness can be expected from Persians unless the Persian officers now going there are exceptional men; at the best of times they are poorly equipped to resist suspicion, ruggar and intrigue and they must, being frustrated men, be expected to have less sense of balance than ever.

7. I now summarise briefly the results of my observations:

Origins of the outbreak. The hand of Reza Shah was firm but it was not just. It weighed heavily on the Kurds, less heavily on the Assyrians while still making it plain that they had no hope of equal treatment with the Shiaks. Its instrument was the gendarmerie. When the firm hand was lifted the gendarmerie disappeared and the Kurds dug up their hidden rifles. More than that, they acquired rifles and ammunition from the disbanded Persian troops. Then came General Gupdi and later Serhang Hashimi, literally shouting aloud their intention to disarm the Kurds, to re-establish the status quo. When Hashimi began to recruit gendarmes from among the local Shiak population and to give arms to others so as to build up a numerous force, and when these undisciplined men began by killing the first Kurds they tried to disarm - two men travelling to Meshed to buy goods - the tribes concerned were stung into action.

That is the Russian version, and even if it is not perhaps all the story I accept it as substantially correct. The Persians on the other hand say that the Russians have since their arrival made a definite attempt to seduce the people from its loyalty to the Shah, that the Shiaks did not respond, and that the Russians accordingly made up their minds to get rid of them, using the Kurds for the purpose. There are grains of truth in this but I feel perfectly sure that, while they have shown regard and for the Kurds and others who are well-disposed to the Soviet, the Russians never planned the expulsion of the Shiaks from their villages. I have no doubt that they were astonished by the extent of the panic which followed the attack of the Kurds on the gendarmes. It is most regrettable that the men on the spot have remained inactive; most probably they are under / remote

remote control from Bakhshlev which failed to realize what was happening either from lack of information or from incredulity. But the Persian government has little right to complain. At a moment when it ought to have had its best men on the spot and to have shown zeal and leadership it remained silent and the post of Governor-General stood empty because no one could be persuaded to fill it willingly.

As regards the accusation that the Russians gave the Kurds ammunition I confess I am in doubt, but quite definitely the verdict must be "not proven".

Course of Events. It is not possible to give a reliable account of the progress of the fighting. The villagers are unreliable, the Persian official almost more so, the Russians non-communicative. I feel satisfied, however, that the Kurdish attack fell first on some newly established gendarme posts in the Barandus valley, and that some of the Shiah villagers tried to help the gendarmes. The gendarmes were beaten and the Kurds set about trying to make the Shiaks give up their arms, alleged to have been distributed by Serhang Hashimi or obtained from the Persian army last autumn. The most extraordinary panic set in and villages were evacuated by the Shiaks with or without the firing of the first shot. Pillage ensued of course. But somehow the word went round that the Kera Sunnis and the Assyrians and Armenians had nothing to fear, that they could "stay put" and that word was sufficiently definite to enable them to resist the panic, and even to dare, as many of them did, to receive the goods and cattle, sometimes even the owners themselves, from the neighbouring Shiah villages. With the Russian political officers at my side it was quite impossible to enquire just how this intelligence got around with any hope of a useful reply, but I may be able to discover the truth later.

The Kurds several times came on right to the outskirts of the town. The last occasion was on May 11th, when both the Russians and the local gendarmes stood forth to meet them. In the fusillade a Russian soldier was shot in the leg, but the Russians said it was a gendarme who did it, firing wildly and asked that the relatively untrained gendarmes be made to deposit their arms at their depot and not carry them about. They undertook to maintain order and their request was agreed to. Thus did the Kurds succeed in defeating and disarming the gendarmerie, and it is a fact that since May 11th they have been quiescent.

Present Condition of Affairs. I have nothing to add to my telegraphic reports about the number of deaths and the damage done. As regards atrocities I would add that I still do not believe that even the one woman whose case was mentioned by the Minister of War had her breasts cut off before she was killed. I similarly doubt if there was a single case of rape by the Kurds, and I blame Christian riff-raff for some cases reported recently. It is, however, true that some men had hot irons applied to make them disclose where the rifles were, but on the whole it would be difficult to imagine a greater panic, a more abject flight, for so little killing. Only the unhealthy circumstances which I have described in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 can have produced the present results.

The important fact however, as I have tried to persuade my Russian colleague, is not that the panic was wholly unjustified and the results exaggerated, but that many thousands of people did in fact flee from their homes and are, most of them, still

in the town. It seemed to me when I was looking at their houses, their fields and vineyards a week ago that if only they could get back to work at once the damage would by no means be disastrous. The Governor General was spending £15,000 daily among them. He said there were 40,000 persons and there were certainly great numbers crowded into that small town. I have put the figure at 30,000 and in the absence of any sort of statistics it is a guess as good as any other. There were reports of typhoid and dysentery among these refugees, under a scare all told, so that there seemed, when I was there, to be no immediate threat to health; but the Governor-General's aid was not sufficient for their needs and they were killing off animals both for food and for sale; they were also going forth during the day and cutting down trees which represent capital, and which in any case were not their property. The less worthy elements were stealing on the one hand and trying to get a bigger dole from the Governor-General on the other. Altogether the situation was unhealthy, and its most remarkable feature was the absence of any suggestion of leadership from the Persian officials, although every day's delay meant heavy loss.

Despatch of Persian troops. The news that the Russians had agreed to the despatch of a substantial Persian force caused excitement, especially among the Shiaks and the Kurds. The latter responded with the news that their kinsmen, now migrating from Iraq to the Persian uplands, were coming over "like ants" to their assistance. For their part the Shiaks were already savouring their revenge on the Kurds, a bloody one, and were by implication blackening the faces of the Russians and their friends since Persian arms were to restore that order which, according to them, the Russians had deliberately disturbed, and which even their best friends had to admit they had failed to maintain although it was in their power to do so. There seemed to me to be a strong probability that if the Persian troops came to Reshieh while the villagers were still there in their thousands, not even the wisest of commanders could prevent an outburst of emotion which might produce troublesome incidents. Yet when I got there a deadlock between the Governor General and the Russians was apparent over the establishment of joint road guard posts, and neither side was making any move to persuade the villagers to go home.

Since I began writing this despatch I have had a conversation with the Persian commander. He seems to be unusually reasonable for a Persian officer, and I think he will do his best to avoid incidents. I do not think he is a strong character, however, and I doubt if he possesses the perseverance which his task will demand of him.

His troops are moving northwards slowly because his lorries cannot lift the whole force at the same time as the sections are being leap-frogged. Moreover some of his tank-carrying vehicles have had difficulty in negotiating the tortuous approaches to certain narrow bridges. He cannot now be in Reshieh before the 20th or the 31st, and I can only hope that by then the majority of the villagers will have become tired of the town and plucked up the courage to go home.

The Persian Government's position in Northern Azerbaijan. Despite the government's neglect of this distant province, despite the incompetence and folly of its officers, I found its position surprisingly strong for the moment. I suspect that the Governor-General here has been more active these past months among the more important Kurdish tribes than is generally known, and that the sugar, presents and appointments which he has

/given

given to the chiefs of the larger tribes have been more effective than medals and trips to Bakou. The line, of course, had to be drawn somewhere and for face-saving purposes the government had to establish its authority over some of the Kurds preferably, I would suppose, those within easy reach of Resaieh. Unfortunately as it has turned out, the line was drawn a trifle too high and by his violent foolishness, perhaps also by his inability to secure Russian goodwill, Serheng Hashimi failed signally to establish the government's authority even in the Resaieh plain. The big tribes like the Karapapak, Koxish, Piran, Mangur, Benboukri, Faisullah begli and a large section of the Shekak are on the government's side. It was the smaller tribes, the Begsadeh, the Herki, Mamedli and Hinarli which caused the trouble. They would normally be punished by the despatch of troops to their villages, but this is not the moment for that. For one reason, the 1500 men which these Kurds can, at a pinch, put into the field, would be more than a match for the force now going to Resaieh with Russian approval. The first complication would be a Persian demand for many more troops, and then if they gained the upper hand they would behave in a manner which the Russians would not approve. The wise solution is to extend to these discontented Kurds the benefits which have kept the larger tribes friendly, so as to gain time. The Governor-General at Resaieh thinks it can be done, but the Russians must, at the same time, allow the Persians some means of saving their faces.

Position of the Russians. The Russians came to Azerbaijan with all the prestige which their claim to be the protectors of the peasantry gave them. They have quite lost it, because to the simple peasants of Azerbaijan, and they are the bulk of the population, the results speak for themselves. For them the coming of the Russians, for that matter the Anglo-Russian occupation, has meant heavy loss and the quickening of old hatreds and fears. The Christians abhor the recent disorders almost as much as the Shiaks. They have derived no present benefit from them; on the contrary, they have a lively fear that the day of reaction may come as it has always tended to come in the past. Only the Kurds can be supposed to be happy with matters as they now are, but the best of them are in the Persian government's pay and if the Persians are wise they will make an effort to find a means of pacifying those who have shown themselves strong enough to make serious trouble.

If, however, the Persians now commit some act of folly against the rebel Kurds they may very easily alienate some of those now friendly and cause more than the present small proportion to turn to the Russians as their hope.

I have little doubt, however, that it their conception of their military necessities and not any political theory or ambition which has determined Russian policy latterly in Azerbaijan. The political officers are no doubt at work in a routine fashion, but events have caused them to lose ground so markedly that there must be some overwhelmingly strong reason for continuing in the present policy. I have suspected that Russian military strength in Azerbaijan, far from being an increasing threat to Turkey, is low and that they are genuinely worried about the Turkish frontier themselves. If we were in their place, sharing their apprehensions about Turkey, hearing perhaps of the chauvinistic remarks which Turkish officials are capable of making, I think we too should consider it our duty to neglect no means and to examine the possibility that the Kurds might serve for defensive operations. I have noted from your telegram to the Foreign Office that the Persian authorities and

/the

the Turkish Ambassador have suggested that the Russians have considered using the Kurds against the Turks; it seems to me that this need not be a matter for excitement or resentment in any quarter. Both Turks and Persians whom I have met say that the Kurds have no military value in the modern sense and I think the Russians themselves would agree that for attack they have none, although it might be argued that for defence, on their own ground, they might be of some use. Hence, possibly, their tenderness for the Kurds.

I have several times, in conversation with my Russian colleagues, sensed a revulsion when the possibility of military action against the Kurds was threatened. I therefore concluded that they would at all costs avoid hostilities with them. The signs of a firmer attitude which I saw at Bessiah and the Russian casualties - two killed - in a brush with the Kurds near Khol the other day, gave me some hope that the Russians were really resolved to restore order before the Persian troops arrived. I have since been informed that the Russian patrols in Western Azerbaijan, far from smiting the Kurds whom they find prowling about, shake hands with them, enquire why they are not in their villages, and remind them that it is forbidden to do this and that. They then pass on. Now the Persian commander has informed me, on the authority of the Russian general, that an emissary has been sent to treat with the Shekak minority which caused the trouble near Khol and that they regard the clash as an accident which would not have occurred had they been able to talk with the Kurds beforehand. Moreover, according to the Russian commander, the general has "advised" him not to try to disarm any Kurds. I must therefore revert to my original idea that the Russians will do their utmost to avoid hostilities with any Kurds, and that the policy of tenderness will continue.

Is not the solution for this impasse to be sought on the Russian front? If the Russians are successful there they will not, I feel sure, continue their present policy which must be unsatisfactory for their political officers and distasteful to their soldiers. If this interpretation is correct we cannot but feel sympathy with them in their concern, even if their policy of nursing the Kurds seems hardly worth while to us. I do not know what the prospects may be of persuading them to revise their policy here, but I judge that it would be difficult and perhaps hardly worth while. The issue will be decided on the Russian front before many months.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble servant,

Sgd. R. W. Urquhart

Iran Kurds 152/142/42

TELEGRAM.

How received.

PARAP

x. Sent
3/6

From : H.M.CHARGE d'AFFAIRES : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
TEHRAN. BAGDAD.

Copies to :
G.O.C. Despatched : 2.6.42 (1245)
A.O.C. Received : 3.6.42 (1100)
C.I.C.I. Decyphered : 3.6.42 (1200)

No. 193 of 2.6.42

Soviet Embassy are anxious about the hostile intentions of Herki tribesmen in the neighbourhood of Rezaieh. They number about 8,000 and this year are armed as they have not been compelled, as in previous years, to deposit their arms at Iranian frontier. Soviet Embassy have asked whether we can take any action to secure withdrawal of the tribe. I promised to communicate the facts to you in case any pressure were possible from Iraqi side but I held out little hope of any satisfactory result.

...

MW
RK
RK

See - 144/-

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Iran: Kurds 152/141/42 ✓

(152/141/42)

3rd June, 1942.

Dear Sir

-/124/. Your letter 6/11/42.

The Charge d'Affaires at Tehran does not think that anything is to be gained by your seeing the chiefs of the Kalhor, Walad Begi and Sanjabi, and fears that their visit to you might not be approved by the Persian Government, who are now cooperating with the Legation in tribal matters.

He adds that if the chiefs wish to consult a British authority they should address themselves to His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah.

VH
JM
RK

Y. L.
VA

Colonel
L. A. L. L. L.

NOTHING TO BE W

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152

Iran: Kurds 152/140/42

TELEGRAM.

How Sent

Indiv

From : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

To: H.M. Minister, Tehran.

Copies

Date 2.6.42.

Sent To:-

No. 152

Time Despatched 18.30 hrs

x GOC 3
x AOC 1
x CICI 2

*Send
3/4*

(152/136/42)
(152/131/42)

Addressed to TEHRAN TEL NO.152 (Via F.O.)

repeated to Foreign Office No.569
Minister of State No.203
Kermanshah No.15.

Foreign Office telegram No.559 to me.

What is the latest news from Kermanshah about the ~~Bana~~ situation. Information available here indicates that following the settlement referred to in my telegram No.147 Kurdish forces including Hama Rashid's contingent have dispersed and ~~Bana~~ Beg Zadah have taken up their official posts.

Recommendations to Iraqi Government about Hama Rashid must clearly depend on the nature of the settlement reached at Bana.

CORNWALLIS.

VH/KC
MM
MR/RK

Drafted after consultation
with Mr. Edmonds and
Col. Lyon.

(sgd) VH

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Iran Kurds. 152/139/42

No.C/11/289.

POLITICAL ADVISER'S OFFICE,
NORTHERN AREA.

Kirkuk, 27th May, 1942.

Edmonds
29/5

Oriental Secretary,
British Embassy,
Baghdad.

-/120/- { In continuation of my C/11/250 dated 23rd May. After interviewing Edmonds yesterday who told them that he had heard that Karim Beg and the Vaykil of Juanro and the other chiefs had come to an understanding among themselves over their attitude to the Persian Authorities I dismissed Sirdar Amjad and his companion Dara Khan.

I told him I had no authority to make any promises and that he was presumably included in whatever settlement was made, for good or ill. He seemed a bit sticky, and disappointed that some special measure was not forthcoming for himself and it seems to me that the Persians have successfully appealed to tribal greed and patched up some sort of agreement which already contains the seeds of discord.

Adams

LIEUT:COLONEL,
POLITICAL ADVISER,
NORTHERN AREA.

J H 4/6

Copy to:

: C.J. Edmonds Esq., C.M.G., Baghdad.

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✓ 1 spare copy
H.B.M's Embassy,
Baghdad.



Memorandum:

I transmit herewith a note on "The Situation in Persian Kurdistan" as gathered by me from Iraqi-Kurdish sources during a tour in the Halabja district between May 17th and 25th. The principal object of my tour was to investigate certain chronic problems arising out of the alignment of the Iraqi-Persian boundary, but much other information naturally came my way. I have not tried to cross-check the information with official sources. The British representatives at Kermanshah will of course have accurate official knowledge of the actual situation, but this view from another angle may serve to make the picture more stereoscopic.

P. I. Brown
ADVISER,
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

Copy to:-

Political Adviser, Northern Area.
C.I.C.I., Baghdad.

NS/

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THE SITUATION IN PERSIAN KURDISTAN.
(as gathered from Iraqi Kurdish sources)

1. In the course of my recent ride in the Halabja region I followed the following route, starting at Halabja:

(a) Map XI/H.I.V.

- May 18. To Sazam (sq. 23d)
" 19. Via Bayin (sq. 26c) and Giriyana (sq. 26d) to Hawar (sq. 26a).
" 20. Via Daratura (sq. 26b) and the boundary watershed and pillar 72, to Tawala (sq. 21a) visiting also pillar 76.
" 21. To Biyara (sq. 20a) to Sargat (sq. 14c near Daranaw).
" 22. Halt Sargat.
" 23. To Gulp (sq. 14c) and thence by car to Khurnal and Panjwin (map XI/H.I. sq. 20).

(b) Map XI/H.I.V.

- " 24. To Nimawa Suta (sq. 23d) and thence to pillars 89, 90, 91, 92, 93 & 94 & Panjwin.

2. It will be convenient to deal with the situation in the trans-frontier districts, as described to me by the Kurds with whom I came in contact, in the following order: Bama, Saqqia, Samj Balaq (Mahnabad), Urmiya (Rimniya), Sardacht, Kharkhara, Marivan, Hewraman y Takha, Hewraman y Lahna, Juwarud, Jaf of Juwarud, Sinjahi and Kalkar.

B.A.B.A.

3. On May 24th at Panjwin I saw Sheikh Qadir of Chumal; he will be remembered as the representative of Hama Rashid of Woma who visited Baghdad in the early days of the Kurdish revolt and created a favourable impression by his laconic manner and common sense. He informed me that two days earlier agreement had been reached between the Kurds and the Persians on the basis that the administration of the Bama district is to be left to the local Begudas, the Government to provide arms for 400 ~~men~~ recruited by the Begudas themselves. The posts allotted to various Begudas number twelve, six civil and six public security. The principal nomination he gave me as follows:

Governor (on 12 p.m.)
Chief of Customs
Director of Revenue
Minister
Mayor

Selim Khan
Hama Karim Beg
Hassanullah Khan

Abdullah Khan of Saraband

Chief of Police

Hama Rashid Beg of Dilaka (son of Hama Salih of Gela in SW Iraq).

Chief of Amiya

Hama Amin Beg (brother of Hama Rashid Beg of Wama).

Deputy Chief of Amiya

Hassan Beg (uncle of Hama Rashid).

The expenses of the "administration" and pay of the amiya etc. are to be found from local revenues supplemented if necessary from the Central Treasury.

4. Shaikh Qadir claimed that the Kurds under Hama Rashid had never been defeated by the Persians in the recent operations; in all battles and skirmishes they had been successful and taken prisoners. But the life of a tribal lashkar is limited at the best of times owing to the supply problem; the riflemen must disperse from time to time to their homes, and ~~then~~ then remobilize. (I have little doubt that Hama Rashid did come over to his villages in Iraq two or three times during these lulls, but not with armed bands escaping pursuit). The supply problem was rendered more difficult than usual by the desertion of villages following aerial bombardment. It was during one such interval that the Persians suddenly advanced to Bama, but when the lashkar re-mobilized they retired and utilized the services of Ali Agha Hajji Ikhani Dehkhvi as a mediator between the Government and the tribes. Hama Rashid Khan demanded the control of both Bama and Saqqin; the Persians declined to include Saqqin, to which they had made local appointments, but offered Hama Rashid the governorship of Bama, a salary of 25,000 p.m. and other concessions if he would admit himself a Persian subject. Finding that the other Begs (who felt that unlike their leader they had no "light" behind them, ~~no~~ support or line of retreat) were disposed to accept the terms offered, Hama Rashid replied that he had performed his duty by his compatriots, had no ambitions for himself, and would retire to tend his tobacco plants in Iraq.

S.A.S.S.I.

5. Saifullah Khan (formerly interned in Tehran) has been appointed Governor, Ahmad Khan & Khalil Khan is Chief of Amiya, and other posts have been distributed to various notables. Unlike the arrangement at Bama certain Persian officials will also be appointed.

SANJ BILAS

6. Shaikh Qadir stated that Ali Agha Hajji ilkhani had been appointed Governor, with Qasi Muhammad holding another important post, the arrangements being much as for Saqqis. Ali Agha is now regarded by the Kurds as their quisling No. 2.

HERIYA (BIZAYA)

7. The Kurds say that Saiyid Abdullah has been appointed Governor (which we know not to be the case) but are aware that the Russians really control the situation and admit that the Persians also have a footing.

SERPASHI

8. Neither Shaikh Qadir of Chirwan (at Panjwin) nor Hajji Abbas Agha Pishier (at Sulaimani) knew of any negotiations between the Persians and Kurds to "regularise" the ~~present~~ position here, which remains as it was after the tribes had turned out all vestiges of Persian authority last autumn. The former thought that the Persians would give ~~themselves~~ the principal appointments to non-Iraqi Pishier Aghas. It may be surmised that any arrangements made will be on the same model rather than that of Saqqis.

KHAKHRA

9. It is reported by official Iraqi sources that the Persians contemplate appointing Sulaiman Khan of the Bughandi Jaf as Governor of this district situated between Saqqis and Herivan. Sulaiman Khan had been in Panjwin but, hearing that I intended to visit the Shikar valley (which in the event I had no time to do), he unfortunately left before my arrival

and

and I was thus unable to get a first hand account of what was happening in the Khurkhura district. This if true is a good illustration of the divide-et-impera policy of Shahbakhti.

MERIVAN.

10. Mahmud Khan of Kanisavan, very soon after his release from Telvan, reappeared in Merivan as the Persian ~~governor~~ or Deputy Governor, and by now is presumably drawing pay for himself and for his allotted quota of anniya. This has not prevented him from protesting solidarity with his tribal neighbours when things seemed to be going in their favour. No Persian officials are posted in Merivan, but Mahmud Khan is said to be visited from time to time by officers not in uniform. Mahmud Khan is branded as Kurdish quelling No.1 whose unreliability prevented the unification of the tribal effort; and the present situation in Merivan is not considered a success for the Kurdish cause.

MERIVAN I ZALLI

11. At the time of my visit to Sargent (May 22nd) the Persians had not yet begun to negotiate with the leading Begs (who are Asad a/o Durrat Beg of the Mousultani section, Abdullah a/o Mahmud Khan Dizi for the Baranbegi, and Hasan a/o Hussein Khan for Mustafacultani) and the situation remained much as it was after the original expulsion of the Persians. The leaders are however in close touch with the Lahu Begs and are unlikely to accept terms less favourable than those accorded to the latter.

NEWRAMAN Y LUHUN & JUWANRUD.

12. It will be convenient to take these two districts together. My principal source for this section is Zuhrah Beg, s/o Afraziab Beg my host at Sergat on May 21st and 22nd, who had only just (19th) returned from Juwanrud, though much of his information only confirmed what was already known.

13. It will be remembered that Kerim Beg eldest surviving son of Ja'far Sultan, soon after his release from Teheran, appeared in Newraman y Luhun as the Bakshdar or Deputy Governor on behalf of the Persian Government. After a short spell at Hamsud in Luhun proper he finally took up his residence ^{at} Khanega near Pawa; he was in close touch and agreement with his neighbours Qadir Beg s/o Abdul Rahman of the Wakil family of Juwanrud; the latter being nearer Kirmanshah and more exposed to the brunt of any Persian attack, were the more amenable to the idea of arriving at some modus vivendi with the Persians, though equally determined to admit no Persian Amniya or officials. About the middle of April Amir-i-Kull, Governor of Kirmanshah, accompanied by Yawar Isfandiary Khan, visited Khanega and preliminary discussions regarding administrative arrangements took place on the basis of separate organisations for Luhun and Juwanrud. The Persian representatives returned to Kirmanshah accompanied by Mansur brother of Kerim Beg and Anis Beg, uncle of Qadir Beg Wakil. Anis Beg however became suspicious of Mansur Beg's activities and took French leave from Kirmanshah. His reports on his return seem to have given the impression that Mansur Beg was intriguing to get Kerim Beg appointed Governor of both Newraman and Juwanrud, an appointment which would of course carry the highest pay and all the patronage in the distribution of employment in the "administration" and the Amniya. The result was the fact between Qadir Beg Wakil and the chiefs of the Juwanrud Jaf, Qalkhani, Kalkur etc. reported in Lieut. Colonel Lyon's G/11/250 of 25 May, 1942. They barred the road to Mansur Beg and Yawar Isfandiary as they returned to Khanega; Kerim Beg however met them and escorted them ^{through} through the temper of the Juwanrudis was such that at one moment the life of Kerim Beg himself was in danger as well as that of Yawar Isfandiary.

14. According to Zuhrah Beg this movement was less serious than as reported to me at Sazan on May 18th or as stated by Yagu Beg Sardar Amjad Waladbegi to Colonel Lyon; it was to compose these differences that he himself had been invited by Qadir Beg Wakil to visit Juwanrud, the visit from which he had just returned; nevertheless he himself and Kerim Beg escorted Yawar Isfandiyyar back from Khanaga to Qala' Juwanrud and sent their representatives on with him to Ruwansar.

15. The arrangement came to was that Kerim Beg and Qadir Beg Wakil should be Sarwan - s of anniya in their respective districts (the terms Governor or Bakhshdar are apparently not now being used in connexion with these areas), and that Yawar Isfandiyyar, who took back a nominal roll of the men nominated for the Anniya, was to send from Kirmanshah the rifles and ammunition to arm them together with pay for the month ended 21st May; no Persian was to be admitted into the area, i.e. beyond Ruwansar; the three sons of Ja'far Sultan and a member of the Wakil family still detained in Teheran were to be released; no mention was made of "local revenue" in this connexion. The attitude of the Hurramanis, who realise what Shahbakhhti's policy is, seems to be that nothing is lost and perhaps something gained (viz. rifles and pay for a time) by the arrangements; if and when the Persians try to introduce ~~their~~ officials, or tighter control, they will fight.

16. An element of weakness is the internal ^{sen} discussions of the sons of Ja'far Sultan. The sons of the late Ahmad Beg, eldest son of Ja'far Sultan, now established at Newtshê, in particular resent Kerim Beg's leadership.

JAF OF JUWANRUD.

17. From my previous inquiries at Halabja, Hergat etc. ^{that the} I had concluded/Juwanrud Jaf would follow the lead of the Wakil family, and, when asked by Colonel Lyon to see Yagu Beg Walad Begi, at Kirkuk on May 26th, I informed the latter that, according to my information, much had happened since he had parted from his allies twenty-two days earlier, that Qadir Beg Wakil with Kerim Beg Hurrami

had come to a satisfactory arrangement with the Persian Government, and that he had better go back and get himself up to date. Yagu Beg was aghast at the suggested possibility of an agreement with the Persians, even on the basis of acceptance by the Persians of all the Kurdish demands; this would violate the terms of their Pact which had been reinforced not only by an oath on the Quran but by the far more binding sanction of the decapitation of a dog and some kind of manipulation of its blood (full details of which I had no time to elucidate, for the O.C.No.2 L of C. was waiting for lunch and the opportunity of venting his complaints against the Muir of Penjwin). Yagu Beg maintained that he had been deputed to Kirkuk to obtain "light" (see para 3 above, end) in accordance with paras 2 & 3 of the Pact on the Decapitated Dog (see Colonel Lyon's memo already quoted) and that he could not leave without it. I replied with my usual lecture that British troops had not gone into Persia to break up the Persian administration but to look for Germans; if he and his friends had thought the opportunity a good one to forward their own interests, that was their affair; we could not and would not interfere beyond advising the Persian authorities to be conciliatory to their just demands, and then to seek some satisfactory accommodation with the Persian Government. Yagu Beg is very deaf and in spite of a lot of shouting I fear he was finally edged out of the room (O.C.No.2 L of C looking hungrier and hungrier and more and more incensed with the Muir of Penjwin) still convinced that it was unthinkable that His Majesty's Government would not change their policy so as to conform with the terms of the Pact on the Decapitated Dog.

QALKHANI, SINJANI AND KALKUR.

18. The position in these three tribes was outside the scope of my inquiries for geographical reasons. I note however in the list of contracting parties given in Colonel Lyon's memorandum the names of Qambar Sultan & Jahangir Khan of the Kalkhani and Abbas Khan of the Kalkur. At Malabja on May 17th Hamid Beg Jaf informed me that the representatives of Abbas Khan Kalkur, Sardar Nasir s/o

Qasim Khan Sinjabi, Yagu Beg Waladbegi and others had come to a village on the Iraqi side of the frontier and wished to see him, thereby indicating that they were in close contact with the Juwanrud Jaf, and thus with the Wakils of Juwanrud and Newraman Lahun.

GENERAL REMARKS.

19. From all this it appears that the Persians are seeking to divide the Kurds by negotiating with as many different chiefs as possible and offering or accepting terms involving different degrees of Persian control according to the military exigencies of the situation. The first success was the driving of a wedge between North and South at Meriwan. To the north of Meriwan it seems as if cohesion among the Kurds has broken down. To the south some elements of unity still exist but the internal rivalries of the sons of Ja'far Sultan, who constitute the central nucleus of any possible union, constitute a cause of serious weakness.

Baghdad,
31st May, 1942.

G. J. E.

152

Iran Kurds 152/154/42

TELEGRAM.

How received.

PARAP

From : H.M. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
TEHRAN. BAGDAD.

Copies to :

Despatched : 1.6. 1432

Received : 1.6. 1900

Decyphered :

No. 190

of 31st May, 1942.

Addressed BAGDAD

Rptd. Kermanshah No. 42.

Your telegram No. 145.

I can see no advantage in the proposed visit which would +hardly be unwelcome to the Iranian Government who are now cooperating with us in tribal matters. If the chiefs wish to consult a British authority they should address themselves to H.M. Consul, Kermanshah.

-/128/-

+ 1 change

GDM
JB
RK

HeV
W. H. H. H.
2/6

Shall I inform

Col Lyon accordingly?

VA 2/6

W. H. H. H.
2/6

*(Chiefs of the
Kathur, Waleh
Legi & Singjabe)*

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Iran Kurds

152/136/42.

152

TELEGRAM.

How received.

PARAP

From : Foreign Office,
London.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

Copies to :

x G.O.C. (3)

x A.O.C.

+ C.I.C.I. (2)

Despatched : 31/5/42, 13.20 hrs.

Received : 1/6/42, 07.30 "

Decyphered : " 10.00 "

No. 559

of 30th May, 1942.

Addressed to BAGDAD No. 559.

Repeated to Tehran,
Minister of State,
Kermanshah.

Tehran telegram No. 183 to you.

There can, of course, be no question of our inciting the Iraqi authorities to proceed ~~to proceed~~ against the relatives of Mohammed Rashid. But unless you see objection they might be moved to issue a warning to him that if he does not return to Iraq he will be outlawed and his property confiscated by legal process.

152/126/42 }

GDAM
JM
MR

Schenck draft
1/6 2/6

C

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Tel

152

Iran: Kurds

152/135/42.

SECRET.

Copies sent as below 3/6
No. C/11/273.

Political Adviser's Office,
Northern Area,
Kirkuk, 26th. May, 1942.

Oriental Secretary,
British Embassy,
Baghdad.

152/122/42 } Reference your code enquiry of 23rd regarding a person
called Abdul Rahman of Persian Nationality living in Suleimani.
Investigations reveal three Persians of that name and nationality.-

No. 1 is registered in Suleimani but has been living
in Arbil since 1940 and is a Chaichi.

" 2 is a Hammal from Sekez.

" 3 is a merchant from Baneh who has lost most of
his money and has been living in Suleimani since 1938.

The Police have nothing on any of them but on my suggestion are
watching them. As the Mutasarrif and Commandant of Police of
Suleimani and the Qaimmaqam of Halebja have no love for Hama
Reshid Khan I feel confident that his agents if any will be well
looked after and I think you are safe to make a denial. Meanwhile
any further particulars about the man such as his Fathers' name
origin etc. would assist, since Abdul Rahmans are almost as
common as Mohammeds.

Chun 636
ref - 1124 - AUE
Lieut. Colonel,
Political Adviser,
Northern Area.

GAOL
UICL
DOC
VA 1/6
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Rec'd via
Telran

SAVINGRAM

=====



To: Minstate Cairo No. 77
Bagdad for Tenth Army No. 107 ✓
Ankara No. 11
Kuibyshev No. 35

Date: 26th May, 1942.

Following from Foreign Office No. 808 of 22nd May.

BEGINS: Following received from Tabriz No. 13.

BEGINS: My immediately preceding telegram.

7. New Governor-General seems to be great improvement on his predecessors. He is conciliatory and professes agreement with the following views.

A. Kurdish policy of the late Shah is not practicable in Russian zone.

If it is attempted there will be complications with Soviet authorities and Kurds now friendly may join the rebels. There is no genuine demand from Kurds as at present divided for independence, but type of Persian repression might create it. Russians are at present making no real political progress, nor will they if Persians are wise. Governor-General is confident that he can reach understanding with the rebels and has published his willingness to receive leaders. Turkish Vice-Consul told me that Kurds had sent him feelers for retreat into Turkey in case of need (clearly he would offer no prospect of this), so I suggested that he try to bring the parties together.

B. Troops now on the way can have appearance of coming to retrieve the situation created by Russian duplicity or mismanagement.

Shiahs regard them as reinforcements in suspended battle and are trying to keep villagers in the town until they arrive. Kurds are turning to the tribes now migrating from Iraq for compensating help. The Governor-General agrees that hostilities must be avoided if possible, and asks that H.M. Minister supports his telegraphic request that troops shall be under his control for reasons of policy. On 18th May I got him and the Soviet Consul to make arrangement for return of the villagers. Governor-General published stern notice the same evening and Soviet authorities supplied escorts next morning. Crowds pulled down the notices demanding money compensation on the spot instead of in the villages as offered, so few left that day, but I think movement may increase.

C. Government would do well to refrain from reinstating the detested Gendarmerie in Western Azerbaijan for the present.

Governor-General is disposed to substitute troops for these eventually. Government must give proof that there will be equality of opportunity for minorities. In practice this means that some more Kurds must be given jobs and licenced to keep proportion of their men under arms, but in the Government service. This would be cheaper than even a minor military campaign. Above all, troops should be symbolic merely.

8. Background. Rezaieh is haunted by memories and fears of massacre (1 g.o.) extent that few retain calm and balanced outlook. Chief of Police refuses to leave his house for fear of Russians. Turkish Vice-Consul showed me in his bedroom machine guns, rifles, shot guns and several revolvers saying that he would certainly defend himself. French Missionaries showed me bones protruding from ruins of their former mission buildings as justification for the assertion of melancholy conviction that Christians will eventually have to pay (2 g.u.) Moslems are taking comfort in opium and threats. Landlords and upper layer of citizens have almost all left; the last qualified doctor came away this week. With 30,000 (Persians claim 48,000) discontented villagers hanging about, there has been natural increase of lawlessness. In this unhealthy atmosphere my visit was of course given embarrassing importance, /and I

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Handwritten notes:

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[illegible]

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Hester
2/6 074

Iran : Kurds

152/132/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received :

PARAP

From : COLONEL LYON
KHANAQIN

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGHDAD.

Copies to :

Despatched : 31.5. 0830

Received : 31.5. 1000

Decyphered : 31.5. 1115

No. Unno.

of 31st May, 1942.

No confirmation in Kifri or here.

+ corrupt

Proceeding Qasr+Shirin with Qaimaqam
today. Baquba and Bagdad tomorrow.

GDM
JB
JM

21/6

? ref -/130/-

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Iran : Kurds 152/131/42.

TELEGRAM.

How Sent

PARAP

Copies

Sent To:

From : H. M. AMBASSADOR.
BAGDAD.

To: H.M. MINISTER, TEHRAN.

Date 29th May, 1942.

Time Despatched 29.5. 1850

No. 147

G.O.C.
A.O.C.
C.I.C.I.

Addressed to TEHRAN No.147

Rptd. Foreign Office No.556.
Kermanshah No.14.
Minister of State, No.194

Your telegram No.183.

Edmonds (who returned yesterday from visit to Kurdish areas on Persian frontier) reports that Persian authorities appear to have come to terms with Bana Beg Zadahs. He had heard that Hama Rashid was offered governorship but refused and was about to withdraw to Iraq.

2. If he does so I shall press Iraqi Government to render him harmless but I cannot hope to be able to persuade them to try to force him to return to Iraq by threatening to take action against his relations or his property.

CORNWALLIS

VH/GHT/KC
JB
AA

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